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ABSTRACT
New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy 
sitting in the middle of the South Pacific. Despite its isolation, it is a highly 
developed nation with a relatively progressive political stance including well-
established mechanisms of direct democracy. This paper aims to explore New 
Zealand's  experience with  direct  democracy,  from the  introduction of  local 
referendums  at  end  of  the  19th century,  to  the  2009  citizens  initiated 
referendum on parental  corporal  punishment.  It  will  set  out  the  legislative 
basis that provides for the holding of referendums and initiatives and then, in 
turn, address the three types of referendums provided for under New Zealand 
law: constitutional referendums, referendums initiated by the government and 
citizens initiated referendums.
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1. Introduction
The  use  of  referendums  in  New  Zealand  has  been  infrequent.  Political 
scientists  observe that  this is not surprising given that while  New Zealand 
flirted early on with quasi-federalism, a constitutional  regime was instituted 
that  strongly  resembled Britain's  in  its  lack  of  rigidity  (Butler  and Ranney, 
1994).  Attempts to introduce direct democracy on a national scale in New 
Zealand began almost 120 years ago with the Referendum Bill of 1893 which 
provided for  non-binding,  government-initiated  referendums.  The Bill  came 
about following the successful introduction of referendums at the local level in 
the 1880s, but failed to receive the majority support in Parliament required to 
proceed.  In  the  following  years  the  Bill  was  reintroduced  to  Parliament  a 
number of times with no success and finally disappeared from the legislative 
scene in 1906. The issue of direct democracy was brought up again in 1918 
and 1919 when the Social Democratic Party introduced the Popular Initiative 
and  Referendum  Bill.  However,  like  previous  attempts,  this  too  was 
unsuccessful.1 
In 1984 the direct democracy movement was revived with the introduction of 
the Popular Initiatives Bill that would have allowed citizens to force the holding 
of indicative referendums upon the presentation of a petition signed by more 
than 100,000 electors. This Bill was likewise unsuccessful, however instead of 
disappearing like the others, it was referred to the Royal Commission on the 
Electoral  System  in  1986  as  a  submission  in  support  of  the  use  of 
referendums. In chapter 7 of its report, the Commission carefully considered 
the  many  submissions  received  and  the  arguments  for  and  against  the 
different types of referendums. The Commission concluded that while it was 
appropriate for governments to hold referendums from time to time on specific 
constitutional  issues,  there  should  be  no  provision  for  citizens  initiated 
referendums (CIRs). It referred to initiatives and referendums as "blunt and 
crude devices which need to be used with  care and circumspection...They 
would blur the lines of accountability and responsibility of Governments and 
political parties, and blunt their effectiveness."2 
Despite  the  Commission's  recommendation,  the  government  showed  its 
support  for  CIRs by passing  the  Citizens Initiated  Referenda Act  in  1993. 
Thus New Zealand became the first Commonwealth country, and one of only 
a few countries in the world, to provide for this bottom-up method of direct 
democracy,  alongside  the  long  established  top-down  methods  of 
constitutional referendums and referendums initiated by government. 
1 Morris,  Caroline, 'Prospects for Direct Democracy in New Zealand' in Hwang, Jau-Yuan, 
'Direct democracy in Asia: a reference guide to the legislation and practice'.
2 Royal  Commission  on  the  Electoral  System,  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  the 
Electoral System: towards a better democracy, Government Printer, Wellington, 1986, p. 175.
Having  presented  a  short  historical  summary  of  the  direct  democracy 
movement in New Zealand, this paper aims to provide an overview of the 
country's institutions of direct democracy. It sets out the legislative basis that 
provides for the holding of referendums and initiatives, made up of pieces of 
constitutional legislation, and a small number of statutes and regulations. The 
paper then deals, in turn, with the three types of referendums provided for 
under New Zealand law: constitutional referendums, referendums initiated by 
the government and CIRs.  A special  focus is  given to  the 2009 so-called 
'smacking referendum' that stirred up considerable media debate and public 
emotion, not only towards the issue itself,  but also towards New Zealand's 
system of CIRs generally.  Finally,  a  few concluding remarks will  be made 
about the current situation of direct democracy.
2. Legislative basis for referendums and initiatives
The legislative basis for referendums and initiatives in New Zealand can be 
found in constitutional laws, a number of specific statutes and two regulations. 
a. Constitutional legislation
New  Zealand  has  an  unwritten  constitution.  Constitutional  rights  and 
principles are thus found in  a  number of  important  parliamentary statutes, 
treaties,  court  decisions  and  customary  rules  known  as  constitutional 
conventions. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 sets out the basic 'rule 
of law' by affirming, protecting and promoting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in respect of both individual people and the government. Section 12 
provides for the general electoral rights of New Zealanders. The Judicature 
Act 1908 sets out the jurisdiction of the judiciary in New Zealand, while the Bill 
of Rights 1689 (England) establishes the theory of parliamentary sovereignty, 
providing Parliament with supreme law-making power.  The Constitution Act 
1986  describes  the  separation  of  the  three  arms  of  government  -  the 
executive,  the  legislature  and  the  judiciary.  It  accords  Parliament  with  full 
legislative power and provides for its three-year term. The Electoral Act 1993 
provides for the people of New Zealand to decide on certain matters directly 
through referendum, for example, the term of Parliament.
b. Statutes
Three statutes govern referendums and initiatives in New Zealand, namely 
the Electoral Act 1993, the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (CIR Act) 
and the Referenda (Postal Voting) Act 2000. 
The Electoral Act 1993 was established to reform the electoral system and to 
provide, in particular, for the introduction of the mixed member proportional 
system of representation (MMP) in relation to the House of Representatives. 
The Act defines who is eligible to vote, the qualifications required for members 
of the House, and sets out the structures and processes for the holding of 
national  general  elections.3 Section  268  provides  for  a  restriction  on  the 
amendment or repeal of section 17(1) of the Constitution Act 1986 relating to 
the term of Parliament and certain provisions of the Electoral Act including 
sections  35,  60(f)  and  168  relating  to  the  division  of  New  Zealand  into 
electoral  districts,  the  voting  age  and  the  method  of  voting.  According  to 
subsection 2, a reserved provision can only be repealed or amended in two 
cases.  Either  the  proposal  for  the  amendment  or  appeal  is  passed  by  a 
majority of 75% of all the members of the House of Representatives, or the 
proposal is carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the electors 
of  the  General  and Maori  electoral  districts.4  Section  268 itself  is  not  an 
entrenched provision, meaning that the entrenchment of the provisions may 
be  repealed  and  the  issue  amended  at  any  time  by  a  single  majority  in 
Parliament. It is, however, an accepted constitutional convention that those 
voting  requirements  also  apply  to  any  proposal  to  amend  the  protective 
section 268.5
The CIR Act is an Act to provide for the holding, on specific questions, of 
CIRs, the results of  which referendums will  indicate the views held by the 
people of New Zealand on specific questions but will not be binding on the 
New Zealand Government.6 
There are six steps in the process. First,  a written referendum proposal is 
submitted  to  the  Clerk  of  the  House  of  Representatives  as  according  to 
section 6. Second, the Clerk advertises the proposed question in the Gazette 
and  major  newspapers.  The  public  then  has  28  days  to  make  written 
comments to the Clerk on the wording of the proposed question. The Clerk 
has three months to determine the final wording of the question which must 
clearly convey the referendum's purpose and effect, and be such as to ensure 
that only one of two answers may be given. Once the wording is determined, 
the Clerk also approves the form to be used for the collection of signatures to 
the  petition.  These  requirements  are  set  out  in  sections  7  to  12.  Third, 
according to sections 14 and 15, the promoter of the question then has 12 
months in which to gather the signatures of  at  least  10% of all  registered 
voters  and deliver  the petition to  the Clerk.  The petition lapses if  it  is  not 
delivered within  this  time period.  Fourth,  the  Clerk  checks the  petition  for 
compliance, for example, that all signatures are on approved petition forms. If 
the procedure has been correctly carried out the Clerk gives the petition to the 
Speaker who then presents it to the House of Representatives. If there are 
insufficient signatures, the Clerk certifies that the petition has lapsed and the 
promoter has a further two months to re-submit the petition with additional 
3 http://www.hrc.co.nz (last accessed 18/01/10)
4 http://www.legislation.govt.nz (last accessed 09/02/10)
5 http://www.cabinetmanual.cabinetoffice.govt.nz (last accessed 26/01/10)
6 http://www.legislation.govt.nz 
signatures. These requirements are stipulated in sections 18 to 21. The fifth 
step concerns the holding of  the referendum. According to section 22, the 
Governor-General  either  sets  a  date for  the  referendum within  one month 
after the date on which the referendum petition is presented to the House, or 
specifies that the referendum is to be conducted by postal  voting. Section 
22AA states that the referendum must be held within a year after the date of 
presentation to the House unless a 75% majority of members of Parliament 
vote to defer it. In the final step the referendum is held and the result declared 
as  according  to  section  40.  The  result  is  indicative  only,  meaning  the 
government  can  choose  whether  or  not  to  act  on  the  results  of  the 
referendum. 
The  CIR  Act  also  prescribes  certain  rules  concerning  advertising  and  the 
limits  on  expenditure  of  the  campaign.  Section  41  states  that  advertising 
related to a petition or referendum is only allowed if it contains a statement 
setting  out  the  name  and  address  of  the  person  for  whom  or  at  whose 
direction it is published or broadcast. According to section 42, it is an offence 
for  a  person  to  spend  more  than  NZ$50,000  advertising  the  petition  and 
likewise to spend more than NZ$50,000 promoting or opposing the answer to 
the referendum. The maximum fine in both cases is NZ$20,000.
The Referenda (Postal Voting) Act 2000 provides for the use of postal voting 
for both government and CIRs in New Zealand, and applies if the Governor-
General  makes an Order  in  Council  providing that  a  specified referendum 
must be conducted by postal voting.7 The Act overlaps considerably with the 
CIR Act.
c. Regulations
There  are  two  sets  of  regulations  relating  to  the  CIR Act,  as  pursuant  to 
section 58 of  that Act;  the Citizens Initiated Referenda (Fees) Regulations 
1993 and the Citizens Initiated Referenda Regulations 1995.8 The Citizens 
Initiated Referenda (Fees) Regulations prescribe the fee that is required to 
accompany every proposed referendum petition,  namely NZ$500,  which is 
payable  on  the  submission  of  the  proposal  to  the  Clerk  of  the  House  of 
Representatives. The Citizens Initiated Referenda Regulations 1995 prescribe 
the requirements and forms in relation to the referendums held under the CIR 
Act, including the form of the voting paper and modifications to provisions of 
the Electoral Act in relation to special voting at a referendum. 
The legislation prescribing referendums and initiatives in New Zealand is by 
no means prolific and its content is not overly prescriptive. The constitutional 
legislation sets out principles in general terms while the Electoral Act provides 
7 http://www.legislation.govt.nz 
8 http://www.legislation.govt.nz 
for the legal basis for the electoral system as whole. The CIR Act was enacted 
in the same year as the Electoral Act introducing the new MMP system, and 
as a consequence, passed almost unnoticed (Mapp, 1995). Although the CIR 
Act prescribes the steps for the holding of CIRs, as will be discussed below, 
the specifics are not always clear. 
3. Constitutional referendums 
As  shown  in  the  previous  section,  under  New  Zealand  law  there  is  no 
requirement for a referendum to enact constitutional change. In fact,  apart 
from the aforementioned sections of the Electoral Act and section 17 of the 
Constitution Act, the amendment of constitutional provisions requires only a 
simple 51% majority of members of Parliament. That said, referendums have 
been used a number of times to decide constitutional matters. 
There have been four instances where the government has held a referendum 
on a constitutional matter. Enabling legislation was passed in order for the 
referendum result to be binding and not merely indicative for three out of the 
four  referendums.  The  first  constitutional  referendum  was  held  on  23 
September 1967 and concerned a proposal to extend the legislative term of 
Parliament from three to four years.  68.1% voted in favour of staying at a 
three-year  maximum  term  on  a  voter  turnout  of  69.7%.9 The  second 
referendum held on 27 October 1990 together with parliamentary elections 
concerned exactly the same matter. The turnout was much higher this time, at 
85.2%. With a similar result to the 1967 referendum, 69.3% voted in favour of 
maintaining the status quo, namely a three-year legislative term. 
Both the 1992 and 1993 constitutional referendums concerned the reform of 
New Zealand's  electoral  system.  Public  dissatisfaction with  the conduct  of 
both  major  political  parties  and  a  breakdown  of  confidence  in  Parliament 
generally had been steadily growing since the 1970s. Particular criticism was 
made  of  the  1978  and  1981  general  elections  where,  while  the  Labour 
opposition obtained more votes overall than the National Party, the latter won 
more seats in Parliament and thus remained in power.10 The concept of a 
system of more proportional representation became a hot topic of debate. In 
1984, Labour appointed a Royal Commission to look into the electoral system. 
In 1986 they published a report  recommending,  amongst other things, the 
adoption of MMP, a proportional representation system similar to that used in 
Germany and an increase in the size of Parliament from 99 to 120 seats. 
Under MMP, members of Parliament are elected not only from constituencies 
but  also  party  lists,  which  effectively  makes  a  party's  parliamentary 
representation proportional to its share of the overall vote (Leduc, 2003). The 
Commission furthermore recommended that a referendum should be held on 
9 Statistical  information  for  all  referendums  held  in  New  Zealand  can  be  found  at 
http://www.c2d.ch/votes.php?table=votes (last accessed 23/03/10) 
10 http://www.elections.org.nz (last accessed 09/02/10)
the  issue.  Neither  Labour  nor  the  National  opposition  supported  the 
Commission's report; however in a bid to politically outmanoeuvre each other, 
both parties included the promise of the holding of a referendum on electoral 
reform in their 1990 election campaigns.11 The National party went on to win 
the 1990 election. The new government soon found itself under increasing 
pressure from the New Zealand public to hold true to its campaign promise.
On 19 September 1992 the National government finally agreed to hold an 
indicative referendum on the subject. The question was divided into two parts. 
Part  A  asked  voters  whether  they  wanted  to  change  the  existing  voting 
system or retain the First-Past-the-Post system (FPP) as prescribed in the 
Electoral Act 1956. Part B asked voters to indicate support for one of the four 
prescribed new voting systems: Supplementary Member, Single Transferable 
Vote, MMP or Preferential  Vote. The government promised that if  the vote 
resulted in a majority vote for change, a binding referendum would take place 
the following year with a choice between FPP and the most popular reform 
option.12 While  the  turnout  for  the  referendum  was  only  55.2%,  an 
overwhelming 84.7% of  voters  supported  change,  with  70.5% indicating  a 
preference  for  the  MMP  system.  In  a  comment  on  the  results  of  the 
referendum,  the  then  Labour  leader  Mike  Moore  said:  "The  people  didn't 
speak on Saturday. They screamed."13
The  promised  binding  referendum  was  held  on  6  November  1993.  The 
enabling Act in this case was the Electoral Referendum Act 1993 which, as its 
title states, was enacted specifically to provide for the holding, in conjunction 
with the 1993 general election, of a referendum on proposals for the reform of 
the electoral system.14 The Electoral Act was drafted prior to the referendum 
and  detailed  how  the  MMP  reform  option  would  work.  In  1992,  the 
government  created  the  Electoral  Referendum  Panel,  an  independent 
organisation charged with educating the public about the reform options. It 
gained voters' trust free from any political agenda and in addition to providing 
information  about  the  various  reform  options,  was  able  to  adjudicate  on 
factual  disputes  between  the  opposing  lobby  groups  (Seyd,  1998).  The 
turnout for this referendum was a much higher 85.2%, not surprising given 
that it was held on Election Day. The result was close compared to 1992 but 
still clear; 53.9% of voters favoured MMP. Voters who had supported change 
in  the  1992  indicative  referendum  not  surprisingly  voted  for  MMP,  but 
interestingly,  among  first-time  voters  in  the  1993  referendum,  the  division 
favoured FPP (Leduc, 2003). The new electoral system was codified in the 
Electoral Act which came into force in the same year. 
11 http://www.elections.org.nz 
12 http://www.elections.org.nz 
13 http://www.elections.org.nz 
14 http://www.legislation.govt.nz 
On 20 October 2009 the government announced that it will hold a referendum 
on the electoral system in conjunction with the 2011 general election. A vote 
on this  issue was  part  of  the National  Party's  election  campaign in  2008. 
National leader John Key believed there was a strong call from voters to give 
their opinions on the current MMP system and stated that if the system were 
to be changed his personal preference would be the Supplementary Member, 
a system allowing for proportionality while ensuring it was not the dominating 
factor.15 The vote  will essentially be the same as the 1992 referendum. The 
question will be divided into two parts; part A will ask whether MMP should be 
retained and part B will  give the voter four voting systems to choose from 
regardless of their answer in part A. While this vote will not be legally binding, 
the government has made a commitment that if a majority favour change, a 
second, binding referendum will be held with the 2014 general election asking 
voters to choose between MMP and the preferred voting system.16
4. Referendums initiated by the government
a. National level 
The  New  Zealand  government  may  choose  to  hold  a  referendum,  either 
indicative or binding (accompanied by the necessary enabling legislation), on 
any issue. The referendums initiated by government can broadly be separated 
into two categories: liquor licensing referendums and other referendums. 
Between 1894 and 1914 compulsory local licensing referendums were held 
with each parliamentary election as provided for in the Alcoholic Liquors Sale 
Control  Act  1893.  Voters  were  given  three  options  to  choose  from:  the 
granting of new licences, reduction, or prohibition. In 1918, an amendment to 
the Licensing Amendment Act 1910 repealed the legal requirement for these 
local referendums on alcohol policy.17
In 1910 the Government introduced a referendum on national prohibition that 
was held in conjunction with general elections between 1911 and 1987. At the 
first poll a majority did vote for prohibition, however the 60% threshold was not 
reached and it was not implemented. Nevertheless, many bars were closed 
and a minimum drinking age set at 21 years. At the 1919 poll, only the last-
minute addition of votes from returning World War One servicemen stopped 
prohibition from being implemented (Hwang,  2006). Though a total  ban on 
alcohol  was  never  implemented  in  New Zealand,  “prohibitionist  sentiment 
remained deeply  entrenched…It  manifested  itself  in  bizarre  and  restrictive 
15 Travett, Claire, 'Referendum 'no' wouldn't need to spell end for proportionality',  The New 
Zealand Herald, 9 August 2008.
16 http://www.beehive.govt.nz (last accessed 01/03/10)
17 http://www.elections.org.nz 
liquor laws and in peculiar social experiments such as licensing trusts.”18 The 
prohibition referendums were finally abolished by the Sale of Liquor Act 1989. 
There have also been two referendums on longer drinking hours in pubs. The 
first was held on 9 March 1949. At that time alcohol could only be served 
between 9.00 and 18.00. The government considered extending this period to 
22.00. However, on a turnout of 56.3%, a three-to-one majority voted to retain 
the existing hours. The second referendum was on held on 23 September 
1967. On this occasion there was a much higher turnout of 71.2% and voters 
opted for the government’s proposal to extend drinking hours.
Other referendums have been held in cases where the government was faced 
with a difficult  or potentially unpopular decision, or where opinion was split 
within government. On 9 March 1949, voters were asked whether to allow off-
course gambling. Betting on horse races outside the racecourse had been 
forbidden since 1920. On the recommendation of  a Royal  Commission on 
Licensing, the government launched a referendum under the Gaming Poll Act 
1948 to  allow betting once more.  On a turnout  of  54.3%,  68.0% voted in 
favour of the government’s proposal. 
On 3 August of the same year, New Zealanders were again called to vote, this 
time on the issue of compulsory military training during peace time. The vote 
reflected British Commonwealth solidarity and was endorsed by both major 
parties  (Butler  and Ranney,  1994).  77.9% of  voters  supported  peace-time 
conscription  however  the  turnout  for  the  vote  was  a relatively  low 63.5%. 
Commentators  suggest  that,  “recourse  to  the  referendum  was  probably 
intended more  to  circumvent  opposition  within  the governing Labour  party 
than to let the people decide” (Butler and Ranney, 1994:169). The last of the 
referendums in this category was held on 26 September 1997 and concerned 
the  introduction  of  a  compulsory  retirement  savings  scheme.  It  was  New 
Zealand's first referendum held by postal vote. The vote came about as part 
of the coalition agreement between the National Party and New Zealand First 
party.  In New Zealand's first election under the new MMP system in 1996, 
neither  Labour  nor  National  gained enough support  to  govern  alone.  New 
Zealand  First  had  won  enough  seats  to  hold  the  balance  of  power  in 
Parliament and duly entered into negotiations with both major parties, until 
finally deciding to side with National, the referendum being one of the coalition 
conditions (Preston, 1997). On a turnout of 80.3%, an overwhelming 91.8% 
voted against the introduction of the scheme. 
b. Local level 
Though New Zealand is divided into regions, there is no autonomous regional 
governance and no provision for referendums to be held at a regional level. 
18 Du Fresne, Karl, 'The wowser tradition runs deep', The Nelson Mail, 12 March 2003.
Referendums  can,  however,  be  held  at  the  local  level.   Historically,  as 
previously discussed, triennial local liquor licensing polls were held under the 
Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act 1893. Under the Local Elections and Polls 
Act 1976, non-binding local referendums could be initiated. For example, in 
1992, Tauranga locals voted on the question of fluoridation of the local water 
supply (Hwang, 2006). More recently, the Local Electoral Act 2001 includes 
several provisions on the holding of binding and indicative referendums by 
local  authorities  as  part  of  providing  fair  and  effective  representation  for 
individuals  and  communities  and  upholding  public  confidence  in,  and 
understanding of, local electoral processes.19 According to section 29 of the 
Act, 5% of local electors may demand a referendum be held on a proposal by 
those electors to use a particular electoral system at the elections of the local 
authority.  Section  34  states  that  the  result  of  such  a  referendum  will  be 
binding. According to section 54, there is a requirement that in the case of a 
binding  referendum,  the  consequences  of  each  possible  result  must  be 
stated. Additionally, in the case of a non-binding referendum, the intentions (if 
any) of the local authority on whose behalf the referendum is conducted in 
respect of each possible result of the poll must be stated.
5. Citizens initiated referendums
The use of CIRs in a democracy is seen by many as being an alternative to 
representative  democracy.  Judging  by the  majority  support  its  introduction 
received in the New Zealand Parliament, it appears this was not the case in 
New Zealand. As MP Chris Fletcher noted at the time, "I see this Bill as being 
complementary to our current electoral system. I think that it is progressive 
legislation…New Zealand will be the first Commonwealth country to introduce 
legislation of this kind…" (Morris, 2004:116).
The New Zealand system of CIRs has a number of features that sets it apart 
from  other  models,  namely  its  non-binding  nature,  associated  wording 
process, high signature target, and spending limit on signature gathering and 
voting  campaigns  (Parkinson,  2001).  Unlike  many  other  countries,  New 
Zealand's constitutional framework does not provide the courts with the power 
of judicial review to strike down legislation or referendum results which are 
contrary  to  New  Zealand's  basic  constitutional  and  democratic  principles. 
Making referendums non-binding gives Parliament the flexibility to ensure that 
rights and freedoms are not compromised by referendum results (Graham, 
1994). Former Justice Minister Douglas Graham gave two reasons as to why 
CIRs had been made advisory only. Firstly, decisions on security, foreign and 
some fiscal policy were too important and only the government would have 
access to all the information, and secondly, the threat of the tyranny of the 
majority where, given low turnout rates, very small numbers of people could 
impose their will.20 This feature did not escape critique. In 1992, in a widely 
published criticism, MP and former Prime Minister David Lange expressed 
19 http://www.legislation.govt.nz 
concern about the indicative nature of the proposed initiative system. "[I]t is 
actually a fraud on the community for the Government to ask it for its opinion 
when  the  Government  has  said  it  will  not  necessarily  follow that  opinion" 
(Morris, 2004:116).
In  the  New Zealand context,  the  wording  of  referendum questions  is  less 
precise  than  in  Switzerland  or  California.  The  question  covers  an  issue 
broadly  and  the  drafting  of  specific  legislation  is  the  responsibility  of  the 
government,  not  the  promoters  of  the  referendum.  Though  section  11 
provides that the Clerk shall determine the wording of the precise question to 
be put to voters, in practice he can only influence the wording within limits. 
This is because the Clerk is not  "required or  indeed permitted to  turn the 
proposal  into  something  it  does  not  purport  to  be."21 It  is  the  promoters, 
therefore, who effectively have the last say in how the question will be put. 
The very first petition brought under the CIR Act showed how the wording 
could be problematic. The question determined by the Clerk was: 
'Should the production of eggs from battery hens be prohibited within 
five years of the referendum?' 
The promoters of the petition, the Egg Producers Federation of New Zealand, 
protested that the Clerk failed to keep the wording neutral. Caroline Morris 
highlighted  an  important  problem  in  this  regard  when  she  asked  how  an 
institution was supposed to find a balance between refining the question to 
make it more easily understood by voters and being seen to be influencing the 
wording (Morris, 2002).
The signature threshold requirement of 10% of enrolled voters is very high. 
With current statistics indicating the number of enrolled voters to be almost 
three million New Zealanders22, 300,000 signatures are therefore required. In 
comparison, the threshold in Switzerland is 100,000 signatures (a little under 
2% of eligible voters) and in California either 5% for legislative initiatives or 
8%  for  constitutional  initiatives  is  required.  The  reason  for  setting  the 
threshold  so  high  was  to  limit  the  number  of  successful  petitions,  both 
because of the high cost of holding a referendum (approximately NZ$10-12 
million), and to stop referendums being used in a vexatious manner.23
20 'Citizens Initiated Referenda Bill',  New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Wellington, 1992, 
Vol. 522, p. 6704-05.
21 Egg Producers Federation v The Clerk of the House of Representatives  (20 June 1994) 
High Court Wellington CP 128/94, Eichelbaum CJ cited in Goschik, Ben, 'You're the voice - 
try and understand it: some practical problems of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act', p.712-
13.
22 http://www.elections.org.nz 
23 Op. cit., 'Citizens Initiated Referenda Bill', p. 6705.
The final significant unique feature is the spending limit on signature gathering 
and voting campaigns. Neither the Swiss nor Californian systems have such 
limits.24 The spending limits were imposed to ensure that the process was not 
dominated  by  moneyed  interests,  to  create  a  level  playing  field  between 
supporters  and  those  in  opposition.  However,  an  effect  has  been  "not  to 
equalise power between the different sides of a referendum debate but to 
ensure  that  voters  remain  unaware  and  uninformed  about  CIR  issues" 
(Parkinson, 2001:414). 
Of  the  34  petitions  brought  under  the  CIR  Act  so  far,  only  four  have 
successfully made it to a referendum. The reason most never made it that far 
is threefold. In eight cases, including four of those proposed by the Next Step 
Democracy Movement in 1994, the petition was withdrawn by its promoter. 
Four  petitions  failed  to  reach  the  required  signature  target,  being  10% of 
eligible voters. In these cases the petition was presented on time, however 
checks revealed that there were insufficient valid signatures. The remaining 
17 petitions lapsed, meaning they were not presented to the Clerk on time.25 
While  the  NZ$500  petition  submission  fee  has  been  enough  to  stop 
completely frivolous questions, it is the signature target that presents the most 
significant hurdle for serious petition promoters. 
The  CIR  Act  does  provide  for  some  restriction  on  the  subject  matter  of 
petitions. Section 4 excludes proposals that call for an inquiry into the way a 
previous referendum was conducted, while section 11(2)(b) excludes issues 
that have been voted on in a referendum within the five years prior to the 
receipt of the petition. Despite these minor restrictions, the subject matter of 
the petitions has been diverse and, much to the surprise of politicians, by no 
means limited to  difficult  moral  or  political  issues.  They have ranged from 
battery hens and tobacco products to euthanasia, forestry licences and a new 
national flag. In Switzerland and California initiatives are primarily a tool of 
established elites.26 New Zealand CIR petitions, on the other hand, have, for 
the most part,  been initiated by private individuals and groups without any 
24 Serdült, Uwe, 'Referendum campaign regulations in Switzerland' in Gilland Lutz, Karin and 
Hug,  Simon  (Eds.),  'Financing  Referendum  Campaigns',  Palgrave/Macmillan,  New  York, 
2010, pp. 165-179.
25 Office  of  the  Clerk  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  'Citizens  Initiated  Referenda', 
Parliamentary Bulletin 94:10-99:23 (1994-1999) in Parkinson, John, 'Who knows best? The 
creation  of  the  citizen-initiated  referendum  in  New  Zealand';  Information  provided  by 
Professor Caroline Morris of the Victoria University Law Faculty, Wellington, New Zealand in 
Hwang,  Jau-Yuan,  'Direct  democracy  in  Asia:  a  reference  guide  to  the  legislation  and 
practice'. For the 10 January 2005 petition promoted by John van Buren titled 'Should the 
proprietor of  licensed premises be able to determine whether those premises are smoke-
free?' there are no results available. 
26 Particularly in the case of Switzerland, the elites are no longer primarily political actors but 
rather members of civil society. See Serdült, Uwe and Welp, Yanina, 'Referendos e iniciativas 
populares: análisis de “la ciudadanía" que activa la democracia directa'. Paper presented at 
the 21º IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Santiago de Chile, 11-16 July 2009.
direct role in the legislative process. The few exceptions have been attempts 
by  the  Christian  Heritage  Party  and  a  number  of  members  of  Parliament 
(Parkinson, 2001).
The first successful petition under the CIR Act was sponsored by the New 
Zealand Professional Fire-Fighters Union. The initiative was in protest of a 
proposed  restructuring  within  the  fire  service  which  would  have  meant  a 
reduction in staff and an increase in working hours (Gregorczuk, 1998). The 
question read:
‘Should the number of professional fire-fighters employed full-time in 
the New Zealand Fire Service be reduced below the number employed 
on 1 January 1995?’
The question was unusual on two counts: one, that it aimed to generate a 'No' 
response and two,  that it  directly concerned an employment rather than a 
political issue. The referendum was held on 2 December 1995 with a dismal 
27.0% turnout. A mere 12.2% voted 'Yes', while 87.8% voted 'No'. Despite the 
measure passing easily, the government ignored the result, citing "the loaded 
question  and  the  low  participation  rate  as  well  as  the  general 
inappropriateness of dealing with a complex issue of industrial relations and 
budgeting priorities by such a blunt yes/no question" (Mulgan, 2004:286).
Two CIRs were conducted simultaneously with the 1999 General Election on 
the questions:
‘Should the size of the House of Representatives be reduced from 120 
members to 99 members?’
‘Should  there  be  a  reform  of  our  Justice  system  placing  greater 
emphasis  on  the  needs  of  victims,  providing  restitution  and 
compensation  for  them and imposing  minimum sentences and hard 
labour for all serious violent offences?’
The  vote  on  whether  the  number  of  members  of  Parliament  should  be 
reduced  was  promoted  by  Wellington  superannuitant  Margaret  Robertson. 
She  claimed  that  “a  smaller  Parliament  would  be  more  efficient,  harder 
working, and better ordered because politicians would be too busy to behave 
badly.” On a turnout of 84.8%, 81.5% voted in favour of the proposal, despite 
opposition from a group of 70 political scientists who said that the measure 
would result in a less responsive Parliament. The Labour government ignored 
the result and though New Zealand First MP Barbara Stewart introduced a bill 
in 2006 to reduce the size of Parliament to 100, the bill was voted down. 
The second question, regarding New Zealand's Justice system, was initiated 
by a petition started by Norman Withers of Christchurch as a result of the 
brutal assault on his elderly mother and the lenient sentence he considered 
the perpetrator received. The measure passed with a massive 91.8% majority. 
Much criticism was made of the complex wording of the question. There were 
suggestions that the question was not understood by most voters and that it 
even  breached  sections  5(2)  and  10(1)(b)  of  the  CIR  Act,  namely  that 
initiatives  must  ask only  one question and allow only one of  two possible 
answers. Furthermore, terms such as 'hard labour' or 'serious violent offences' 
were not defined. This time the results of the vote were not completely ignored 
by the government. Some minor amendments were made to the sentencing 
and parole provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1985 and Sentencing Act 
2002, such as an increase in some penalties for serious crime and a modest 
improvement in victim's rights.27 
A  major  issue  of  the  1999  referendums  was  the  lack  of  public  debate 
surrounding them. Media coverage focussed instead almost entirely on the 
general election. New Zealand's largest newspaper, the New Zealand Herald, 
published  only  four  articles  mentioning  Robertson's  initiative,  and  when 
political  scientists  attempted  to  stimulate  debate  on  the  issue,  they  were 
heavily criticised by the media as trying to advance their personal agendas. 
The non-binding nature of the referendums may have been the reason why 
the media did not treat the issues seriously, nor placed importance on their 
coverage.28
A feature of all three CIRs was the lack of information provided to the public 
on  the  issues.  The  CIR  Act  does  not  require  the  government  to  provide 
information  to  voters  unlike  in  Switzerland  and  California.  Attempts  were 
made to produce a pamphlet prior to the fire-fighters referendum however the 
parties could not agree on what information should be provided.29 Prior to the 
1999  referendums,  the  Crown  Law  Office  gave  instructions  to  the  Chief 
Electoral Officer that it was not allowed to educate the public on referendum 
questions unless they related to an electoral matter. While a brochure on the 
members of Parliament petition was produced - though not able to be made 
readily available - no official information was produced for the Justice system 
petition.30
27 Kirkness, Murray, 'Editorial: The referendum fiasco', Otago Daily Times, 24 June 2009.
28 Parkinson, John, 'Who knows best? The creation of the citizen-initiated referendum in New 
Zealand'; Qvortrup, Matt, 'Citizen initiated referendums (CIRs) in New Zealand: A comparative 
appraisal'.
29 Wherle, Gabriela, 'The Firefighter's referendum - should questions arising from industrial 
disputes be excluded from referenda held under the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993?' 
(1997) 27 VUWLR 273, 287 in Goschik, Ben, 'You're the voice - try and understand it: some 
practical problems of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act'.
30 Justice and Electoral Committee. 'Inquiry into the 1999 General Election', [2001] AJHR I 7C 
55.
6. The smacking referendum 2009 - a case study
Between 31 July and 21 August 2009 New Zealand's fourth and most recent 
CIR was held by postal vote on the question:
'Should  a  smack  as  part  of  good  parental  correction  be  a  criminal 
offence in New Zealand?'
The  petition  for  the  referendum was  initiated  in  February  2007  by  Sheryl 
Savill, with support from Kiwi Party leader Larry Baldock, in response to the 
Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment 
Bill - colloquially the 'anti-smacking bill' - that was before Parliament aiming to 
repeal the old section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961.31 
Following intense debate both in Parliament  and publicly,  Green party MP 
Sue Bradford's bill passed with an overwhelming majority of 113 votes to 7 on 
16 May 2007. The result was the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment 
Act 2007 which removed the legal defence of 'reasonable force' for parents 
prosecuted for assault on their children.32 Many objected to the law change. 
Some  outspoken  members  of  the  public  claimed  "that  parliament  was 
becoming  a  'Nanny  State'  and  intruding  on  the  lives  of  ordinary  New 
Zealanders."33  
The petition was initially presented to the Clerk on 29 February 2008, however 
the number of signatures fell some 10,775 short of the 280,275 required to 
force a referendum. Many signatures were excluded because they were either 
illegible, had incorrect date of birth information, or involved people who had 
signed more than once. The promoters were given an extra two months to 
collect the remaining signatures and have their legitimacy confirmed.34 On 23 
June 2008 the petition was presented by Larry Baldock for the second time 
with  390,000  signatures.35 The  Clerk  certified  that  there  were  enough 
signatures  within  the  two  month  time  period  and  a  month  later  the 
Government named the date for the referendum. To the disappointment of the 
promoters, Prime Minister Helen Clark announced that the referendum would 
not take place alongside the 2008 general election, but rather by postal ballot 
and not until  August  2009.  The decision for  a postal  ballot  was based on 
advice from the Chief Electoral Officer who said that holding the referendum 
31 Collins, Simon, 'Petition offers voice against Bradford bill',  The New Zealand Herald, 23 
February 2007.
32 NZPA. 'Anti-smacking bill becomes law', The New Zealand Herald, 16 May 2007.
33 Baron,  Steve,  'Smacking  referendum:  a  biased  New  Zealand  Herald',  p.  2 
www.betterdemocracy.co.nz/studies/php  (last accessed 13/01/10)
34 Watkins, Tracy, 'Smacking petition falls short', The Dominion Post, 29 April 2008.
35 NZPA. 'Smacking petition runs out of time', The New Zealand Herald, 24 June 2008.
at the same time as the election would lead, among other things, to voter 
confusion.36
The  wording  of  the  referendum  question  received  a  lot  of  criticism.  As 
provided for by the CIR Act, the precise wording of CIR questions rests upon 
the Clerk of the House, who must make sure the purpose and effect of the 
referendum is clearly conveyed.37 However the Clerk is under no obligation to 
ensure that the question is balanced or framed in a neutral way. Like the fire-
fighters referendum in 1995, the question aimed to elicit a 'No' response, yet it 
was  also  seen  as  a  very  loaded  question  that  created  confusion.  Prime 
Minister John Key described the question as "ambiguous" and remarked that 
it "could be read in a number of different ways." In fact, many people both in 
support and in opposition of the current law were not sure whether to answer 
'Yes'  or  'No'.38 Murray  Aldridge,  of  Barnados  New  Zealand,  claimed  "the 
question presupposes that smacking is a part of good parental correction [but] 
it also says parents who smack their children are likely to become criminals 
and neither of those things are correct."39 The word 'good' was not defined. 
The principal supporters of the referendum were the Kiwi Party, advocates of 
direct  democracy  led  by Larry  Baldock,  and Family  First  New Zealand,  a 
conservative lobby group. A 'Vote No' campaign authorised by Family First 
was  launched  in  June  2009,  explaining  the  referendum  to  voters  and 
providing proof that the new section 59 was not working and that police were 
now prosecuting  good  parents  when  really  the  important  issue  should  be 
addressing the causes of child abuse.40
The 'Yes Vote'  campaign was  supported by a number of  prominent  child-
focussed  organisations  including  the  Royal  New Zealand  Plunket  Society, 
Barnados, Save the Children, UNICEF and Women's Refuge as well as many 
smaller community groups. The 'Yes Vote' campaign claimed the referendum 
question was poorly worded and misleading. In their opinion the new section 
59 “was working well as shown by: Increased awareness of positive discipline 
and other non-violent parenting techniques; parents who overstep the mark 
and  use  heavy  handed  discipline…not  getting  away  with  a  defence  of 
‘reasonable force’ and being given compassionate and appropriate sentences 
like anger management courses; and no criminal convictions of parents who 
have only lightly smacked their children.”41
36 Trevett, Claire, 'Smack referendum next year, says Clark',  The New Zealand Herald, 26 
June 2008.
37 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, section 10 and 11.
38 Kelly,  Norm, 'The smack',  Inside Story,  28 July 2008  http://inside.org.au (last  accessed 
03/12/09)
39 'Anti-smacking debate goes to referendum', 15 June 2009 http://3news.co.nz (last accessed 
26/11/09)
40 http://www.voteno.org.nz (last accessed 16/02/10)
41 http://www.yesvote.org.nz (last accessed 16/02/10)
The leaders of both major parties decided not to vote in the referendum, with 
Prime Minister John Key calling the question “ridiculous”42. In his opinion there 
was no evidence the current law was not working and he therefore saw no 
need  to  change  it.43 Leader  of  the  opposition,  Phil  Goff,  argued  that  the 
question implied that voting ‘Yes’ meant approval of criminal sanctions being 
taken against reasonable parents.44
The final date for enrolment was 30 July 2009 and voting opened the next 
day. Voting ran until 7pm on 21 August and on 25 August the official result of 
the referendum was announced by the Chief Electoral Officer. According to 
the  results,  an  overwhelming  87.4% of  New Zealanders  voted  'No',  on  a 
turnout of 56.1%.45
Notwithstanding  the  massive  support  for  a  law  change,  both  the  Prime 
Minister and Goff had already made clear statements prior to the non-binding 
referendum that no action would be taken.46 Despite the indicative nature of 
New Zealand's CIRs, Parliament's decision to once again ignore the result 
prompted much public criticism. Media reports47 spoke of the NZ$9 million 
spent on the referendum as a waste of money and, given the governments 
failure to act, a complete waste of time. Former Prime Minister, Mike Moore, 
considered the referendum an expensive scam and mistake on the part of the 
government given the reality of the new section 59. He said, "[t]he legislation 
was never going to achieve what its promoters claimed, and was never going 
to send good parents to court, as its opponents suggested." The editor of the 
Otago Daily Times  was of the opinion that inaction would only cause more 
damage to the concept of CIRs. Given that it was such a controversial topic, 
the  smacking  referendum  should  have  received  in-depth  and  balanced 
coverage by the media however this was not the case. 
On 21 November 2009 a protest march was held against the government's 
dismissal of  the referendum. The 'March for  Democracy',  held in Auckland 
and funded by Auckland businessman Colin  Craig,  involved approximately 
4000  people.  The  march,  and  indeed  the  ongoing  'March  for  Democracy' 
campaign, wants to see law changes that reflect the results of those CIRs 
42 Trevett, Claire, ‘Key sees merit in Greens’ referendum bill’,  The New Zealand Herald, 23 
June 2009.
43 NZPA, 'Key dragged into centre of smacking debate', 18 June 2009 http://www.3news.co.nz 
(last accessed 26/11/09)
44 Ob. cit., Kirkness, Murray, 'Editorial: The referendum fiasco'.
45 http://www.elections.org.nz; http://www.electionresults.govt.nz (last accessed 09/02/10)
46 Ob. cit., Kelly, Norm, 'The smack'.
47 George, Garth, 'Referendum no answer to parental worry',  The New Zealand Herald, 18 
June 2009; Temple, Philip, 'Referendums an expensive distraction',  Otago Daily Times, 10 
December 2009; Moore, Mike, 'Smacking - referendum hoax John Key's biggest mistake', 
The New Zealand Herald, 3 September 2009.
deliberately overlooked by the government.48 A further response has been the 
preparation of a petition for a referendum on binding CIRs, promoted by Larry 
Baldock. The question for the referendum was approved by the Clerk on 14 
January 2010 and, provided enough signatures are collected, will be held with 
the General Election in 2011. 49 The question is:
'Should Parliament be required to pass legislation that implements the 
majority  result  of  a  citizens  initiated  referendum  where  that  result 
supports a law change?'
The  Legislation  Advisory  Committee,  chaired  by  former  Prime  Minister 
Geoffrey Palmer, has called for a veto of the proposed referendum on the 
grounds  that  it  would  "contradict  the  fundamental  purpose  of  the  Citizens 
Initiated Referenda Act 1993, which provided for non-binding referendums."50 
Better Democracy New Zealand, on the other hand, supports the petition and 
believes that binding referendums are not a replacement for representative 
democracy but a supplement; a check and balance on Parliament and the 
next step to real democracy.51
In addition to the petition on binding CIRs, there is one other pending CIR 
petition, the signature deadline of which is 7 May 2010. The promoter is a 
trade union called Unite Union and the question is:52 
'Should the adult minimum wage be raised in steps over the next three 
years, starting with an immediate rise to $15 per hour, until it reaches 
66% of the average total hourly earnings as defined by the Quarterly 
Employment Survey?'
For the binding referendums petition in particular, if the required signatures 
can be collected to force a referendum, it will be interesting to see how New 
Zealanders vote. Given the government's attitude towards the results of CIRs 
in the past, however, there appears to be little hope for the promoters that any 
big changes will be brought about. 
7. Concluding remarks
Despite  initial  expectations,  the  introduction  of  CIRs  "has  not  opened  the 
floodgates of direct democracy" (Qvortrup, 2008:76). In the year after the CIR 
Act came into force, a total of 12 petitions were filed. Since then, however, the 
usage has declined rapidly, not least due to the government's failure to act on 
48 http://www.themarch.co.nz (last accessed 23/02/10)
49 http://www.4democracy.co.nz (last accessed 13/01/10)
50 Collins,  Simon,  'Group  calls  for  veto  of  referendum',  The  New  Zealand  Herald,  17 
November 2009.
51 Better  Democracy  NZ,  'New  Zealand:  an  introduction  to  binding  referendums',  2009 
http://www.betterdemocracy.co.nz/studies/php (last accessed 13/01/10)
52 http://www.parliament.nz (last accessed 24/02/10)
the  results  of  the  few  which  did  make  it  to  a  vote.  The  high  signature 
requirement and spending limits on signature gathering and voting campaigns 
have also inhibited participation on any significant scale. In fact, rather than 
strengthen democracy and give New Zealanders the opportunity to be more 
involved in the legislative process, some political commentators have gone as 
far to say that CIRs are nothing more than large and expensive public opinion 
polls.53 
The New Zealand experience certainly exposes some underlying problems 
with the CIR instrument of direct democracy. Yet would making CIRs binding, 
as is the case in Switzerland and California, improve the situation? A review 
of the CIR Act may be a more useful cause of action. The Act could provide 
more guidance on the framing of referendum questions to prohibit  bias for 
example.  A  requirement  that  the  government  publish  information  assisting 
voters  in  understanding the issue and explaining  the effect  of  their  voting 
choice may also have positive effects (Morris, 2004). 
The attitudes of the leaders of  both major political  parties in the smacking 
referendum is also cause for concern in terms of the future of CIRs in New 
Zealand. Their  decision not to vote undermines the legitimacy of  this very 
important democratic mechanism.
Independently of  CIRs, New Zealand's other experience with  referendums, 
especially  those  on  constitutional  issues,  show that  direct  democracy  has 
been  at  least  partly  successful.  However,  given  that  there  is  no  statutory 
requirement for referendums to enact constitutional change, there is therefore, 
no formula for deciding which constitutional issues should be subjected to a 
referendum and which should not. 
The way in which direct democracy progresses in New Zealand is something 
which will be monitored with interest. The current position suggests that there 
is a significant divide between the attitudes of the government and the citizens 
of New Zealand. Perhaps the greatest challenge will be figuring out a working 
compromise  between  representative  and  direct  democracy  rather  than 
favouring one or the other.
53 For  example:  Palmer,  Geoffrey  and  Palmer,  Matthew,  'Bridled  power:  New  Zealand 
Government under MMP', 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997.
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